It goes without saying that oil exploration and exploitation have far-reaching consequences for the environment. Oil-related activities have done much damage to the fragile Niger Delta region, and to the health of its people as well. Notable impacts of oil extraction have been the loss of biodiversity, ecological devastation/degradation, and the destruction of mangrove forests. The popular perception in the region has been that the operations of the oil companies have led to the gradual destruction of the region's fragile ecosystem. And whenever the oil companies fail to take responsibility for the damage done to the environment, the state's incapacity to address the demands of the local people has been responsible for the conflict between the people of the community (particularly the youth) and the oil companies. In addition, the seeming failure of governments at all levels to tackle the problem has engendered conflicts between the local people and the oil companies, on the one hand, and between the local people and the government on the other.
As a result, ethnic identities and relations have become weapons for contestation in the Niger Delta. Ethnic identities have assumed the character of a mobilizing factor for contesting access not only to oil wealth but also to political power. Ethnicity has also been staked in the organisation of social forces in the struggle against perceived injustices (Obi 2002a) . Ethnic identities have further divided the people of the Niger Delta, often resulting in fratricidal warfare. In the recent past, ethnic groups have acted politically in defence of their interests vis-à-vis those of competing groups. In most cases, inter-ethnic rivalry has arisen over land ownership. The series of clashes between the Ijaws and Itsekiris of the Niger Delta are a case in point.
From the author's interviews with the people from Afiesere and Uzere communities in the Niger Delta, it is clear that the people of the Niger Delta have been disempowered and disinherited from their land through the instrumentality of legislation such as the Petroleum Act (1969), the Land Use Act (1978) , and the Lands Act (Title Vesting) (1993) . These laws vest ownership and control of lands, navigable waters, and the resources found therein, in the hands of the Federal or State Government.
Environmental activists in the region argue that such legislation stifles local initiatives at protecting the environment. Community agitation aimed at the abolition of the legislation, and the reluctance of the government to accede to such requests, have all intensified the activism for resource control, protests, brigandage, and violence.
Given the assistance of oil multinationals to the Nigerian police and the Nigerian Navy in the region, and the total dependence of the state on oil since the 1970s, it is arguable that there exists an 'unholy alliance' between the Federal Government and the oil companies. People from the oil-bearing communities contend that the Government almost always identifies with, and defers to, the interests of the oil companies. The Governor of Nigeria's Akwa Ibom State, Obong Victor Attah, posits that in doing so, the Federal Government gives the oil multinationals the impression that local communities and states in the Niger Delta do not matter, and that all that is needed is continued collaboration and understanding between the central government and the transnational oil companies. Clearly, the government's participatory interest in the oil companies is an impediment to fulfilling its obligations to the people of the Niger Delta.
As a result, the Niger Delta has seen both the militarisation of and the proliferation of arms throughout the oil-producing region. Successive governments have sought to contain the violence through troops and weapons deployment. The aggrieved communities have, in turn, taken up arms against the security forces to counter what they have long regarded as an uncalled-for siege on their communities. The militarisation of the region by the government finds expression in the several cases of military invasion of oil-producing areas experiencing social unrest. Often, massive troop mobilizations by the state have followed cases of agitation by the people against environmental disasters and perceived neglect.
Oil multinationals in the Niger Delta
It must be pointed out that the Nigerian oil industry has been strongly dominated by foreign oil companies and their expatriate workers for decades. Lack of required technology and massive capital involvement in oil exploration have given the foreign oil multinationals an edge over local corporations, a development that has been interpreted by some commentators as a strategic means of denying the people and Niger Delta states the dividends of the resource that belongs to them. The scenario in the oil Relations between the minority and the major ethnic groups now reflect the 'weagainst-them' logic.
The plight of the minority ethnic groups in Nigeria is structurally linked to the creation of the Nigerian state in 1960. However, making that link supports and validates the naïve premise that the colonial enterprise precipitated all subsequent troubles in colonised spaces, while denying historical antecedents and predating tensions. Oral histories suggest otherwise, pointing to an enduring legacy of ethnic conflict and tribal conflict around territory and modes of production. Internecine slave castes/tribal servitudes and land wars testify to this. One aspect of the colonial encounter was often the co-production of an overarching alliance between colonised ethnicities to evict the coloniser, thus making the unitary state congruent to colonial boundaries. It must be stated that the initial resistance by many of Nigeria's ethnic groups was uncoordinated and without proper focus. However, a change to the modus operandi of the struggle became evident in the early 1990s with the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), which emerged to challenge the state apparatus and foreign oil companies, and to assert the need to address the demands of the local people in the oil region.
Given the defective nature of Nigerian federalism, with the centralization of power and domination of minorities by the three dominant ethnic groups-the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo-and given the double standards of foreign oil multinationals, as well as other internal contradictions within the Nigerian state, the people of the Niger Delta were left with no option but peaceful protest, and later, violence, in their struggle against the state and foreign oil companies that operate in the region.
The emergence of social movements in the Niger Delta
The globalisation of capital has played an important role in the confrontation between oil multinationals and the social movements that emerged in the region, especially the Ogoni Movement and the Ijaw Youth Council. Multinational Corporations represent, and are positioned at the centre of, a 'global structure of material accumulation which simultaneously concentrates wealth and energy in certain locales' (Saurin 1996, 42) .
The rise of ethnic militias in the Niger Delta region in the early 1990s (as was discovered by the author in fieldwork) was informed by the marginalisation and social deprivation of the minorities. However, various internal policies propounded by the state and oil companies that gave rise to underdevelopment, combined with external factors like the globalisation of the international system, also strongly influenced the formation of these social movements. The interplay between the internal and external factors thus established a strong linkage between local non-government organizations (NGOs) and social movements, and international non-government organizations (INGOs), and created the setting for the internationalisation of the Niger delta crisis.
With this scenario, local resistance seems to have taken shape and become locally grounded, a reflection of the fact that the very existence of the Ogoni and other minorities in oil-bearing communities had come under serious threat. The environment was destroyed, there was no basic infrastructure, and the Ogonis and other minority groups also faced repression from both the multinational oil companies and the federal government. More importantly, the Nigerian legislation dealing with oil and mineral resources removed control of the land from the people: the land, and its oil reserves, had been 'co-opted into the globalised capitalist economy' (Giddens 1990, 18) . [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] , and the creation of a federalised state to address the demand of the minorities, failed to secure for the oil minorities the control of oil resources. At the same time, the structural adjustment that widened social and power cleavages within the region, and changes in global politics in the post-Cold War era, which emphasized the right to self-determination and autonomy by minority ethnic groups (Obi 1999) , gave impetus to the struggle in the region.
Given these factors, MOSOP, under the leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa, assumed a more dynamic and purposeful character as it adopted far-reaching tactics in the cause of the Ogoni. The organization sensitised the Ogoni people to their predicaments and enabled their mobilization against the state and Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) through demonstrations, the blockade of oil installations, conferences, press releases, and articles in local and international media.
In order to strengthen their chances for self-determination, the Ogoni focused on gaining the sympathy and necessary attention from the international community about the need to address the exploitation, repression and ecological devastation the community was confronting. The organization appealed for support through lecture tours, documentaries, and eyewitness accounts. It also used the platform of international human rights organizations to put pressure on Shell and the Nigerian state to recognize and respect the rights of the Ogoni (Omoweh 1994) . However, the Ogoni failed to consider that the military, which dominated the Nigeria political terrain in the 1990s, appeared to have little regard for the concepts of human rights and moral principles upon which they (the Ogoni) based their campaign (Carr, It is interesting to note that the Ogoni adopted these methods or strategies because earlier methods used by the local elites before MOSOP's inception had failed.
Explanations for that failure lie in the elite control of national political parties, and the organized electoral fraud that made a nonsense of the voting system. For example, the elite in the Ogoni Central Union (OCU) and Kagote 1 refused to involve the masses in the struggle for self-determination. In MOSOP, by contrast, the youth in the region had been given more political roles to play; indeed, a key strategy adopted by the group was to provide every member of the community an opportunity to help in reversing the imbalances of the Nigerian federation.
Despite the huge success of this movement in bringing an otherwise local issue to the platform of international discourse, the struggle of the local people in the 1990s witnessed a severe set back with the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, which greatly reduced international support for local resistance. Ken had personified the struggle. More importantly, the political divisions that erupted after the Saro-Wiwa's death confused the international community in directing its support for the struggle of MOSOP and It is pertinent to state that MOSOP was able to achieve considerable success due to the commitment of its leaders to the struggle. Prior to the formation of MOSOP in the early 1990s, local leaders were not totally committed to the struggle, as was later the case As noted above, the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa changed the course of events in the Niger Delta. It has been rightly argued that his death has given the ethnic minorities of the region the leverage to speak in a 'new voice and demand … that their wishes and aspirations be factored into the Nigerian projects' (Okonta and Oronto 2001). This development has also encouraged the local people to insist on self-determination, for a structure within the Nigerian federal framework that will promote true federalism, equity, justice and negotiated cooperation. That said, Shell has also been called to account and compelled to pay reparation for environmental devastation in the Niger Delta. Resistance by the Ogoni against oil production has historically been considered a direct threat by the Nigerian state and Shell, which is answerable to its headquarters in Britain. Against this background, the centrality of oil to the survival of Nigerian state, and the oil companies' drive for profit maximization, lay behind the militarisation of, and gross violation of human rights in, the region by the state and oil multinationals alike.
The internal contradictions and disputes that emerged within the MOSOP in the late 1990s eventually caused the mantle of leadership in the struggle for the Niger Delta to be passed to the Ijaws. However, it must be stated that, for the Ijaws, this struggle dialogue. There should be delegitimisation of force in favour of legitimisation of dialogue and consensus-building in order to promote a true federalism that would allow the minorities to benefit from the system.
